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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CONTRACTS-INFANTs-ARMY AND NAvY-WAR RISK INSUR-
ANCE-CHANGE OF STATUs.-In 1919, plaintiff's son, a 17-year-old
boy, desiring to enlist in the United States Navy for the period of
his minority, procured the consent of his parents to such enlistment,
as required by statute. Across said consent the parents wrote a
clause providing that such consent was given upon condition that the
boy obtain'and carry war risk insurance in the sum of $10,000, nam-
ing his mother, plaintiff herein, as beneficiary. On the day of his
enlistment the son accordingly took out such insurance directing de-
fendant to deduct the premiums from his pay, his parents having re-
leased their claims thereto. In 1920, the son, in writing, without
plaintiff's consent, and during his minority, requested that his in-
surance be terminated. Thereafter, defendant made no deductions
from his pay on account of premiums. In 1921, the boy was as-
signed to a vessel which left for the southern oceans. The ship, its
officers and the crew were never heard of again and the Navy De-
partment declared all aboard deceased. Plaintiff made demand for
payment under the policy and defendant refused such payment and
plaintiff sued. The plaintiff alleged: (1) the condition written across
the consent and accepted by the recruiting officer constituted a bind-
ing agreement that the enlistment was subject to it; (2) the rescis-
sion of the insurance by the deceased during his minority constituted
a contract, and as such is itself capable of being rescinded by the in-
fant, or, in case of death of the infant during infancy, by his personal
representatives. Held, judgment for defendant. United States of
America v. Augie Crook Williams, 302 U. S. 46, 58 Sup. Ct. 81
(1937).
The statute providing for the consent of parents prior to the en-
listment of minors under the age of 18 years did not confer upon or
leave with the parents any right to condition their consent; nor did
it clothe the naval recruiting officer with authority to bind the de-
fendant by the acceptance of the consent with the condition endorsed
thereon.1 Consequently, the defendant was not bound by the condi-
tion. The United States is neither bound nor estopped by acts of its
officers or agents in entering into an agreement to do or cause to be
done what the law does not sanction or permit.2 Public policy de-
mands this rule.
War risk insurance was made available for the benefit of all
those in active military service for the protection of themselves and
their dependents.8 The plaintiff contends that her son's attempted
rescission during his minority was at best a voidable contract, itself
-34 U. S. C. A. § 161. "* * * minors between the age 'of fourteen and
eighteen years shall not be enlisted for the naval service without the consent
of their parents or guardians".
2 Hart v. United States, 95 U. S. 316, 24 L. ed. 479 (1877) ; Pine River
Logging Co. v. United States, 186 U. S. 279, 22 Sup. Ct. 920 (1901) ; Utah
Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 37 Sup. Ct. 387 (1917);
Wilber Nat. Bank v. United States, 294 U. S. 120, 55 Sup. Ct. 362 (1935).
'WAR RIsK INs. AcT (1917) § 400, 40 STAT. 409.
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subject to rescission by the infant or, in the event of his death prior
to attaining his majority, by his personal representative. That this
is a well-known principle of law cannot be denied. 4 The law, how-
ever, distinguishes between the rights and duties of infants in civil
life and those enlisted in the military service. An enlistment is more
than a mere contract. It effects a change of status,5 the infant be-
coming emancipated from the control of his parents, and, so long as
he remains in the service, is amenable to the military law.0 The
Congress intended under the Act and itsamendments to extend to
minors as well as adults who served in the armed forces of the United
States all of the rights and privileges of the Act, and to subject them
to all of the conditions and limitations contained therein.7 The age
at which persons shall be deemed competent to do any acts or per-
form any duties depends wholly upon the Legislature.8  The insur-
ance policy provided that it was subject in all respects to the provi-
sions of the Act creating it, of any amendments thereto, and of all reg-
ulations thereunder all of which, together with the application, formed
the contract of insurance. 9 The Secretary of the Treasury was
granted power under Section 13 of the Act to make and change regu-
lations governing the administration of the law and pursuant to such
authority determined that the contract of insurance shall lapse and
terminate upon written request for cancellation from any policy
holder.10 By virtue of his change of status the rescission of the
policy by the emancipated minor was valid and binding and the
judgment for plaintiff was rightfully reversed.
M.F.
CONTRACT OF SALE-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-ACCEPTANCE AND
RECEIPT BY VENDEE IN POSSESSlON.-Plaintiff let an apartment to
defendant and in addition to the apartment the lease included, among
other furnishings, three pairs of draperies valued at $150. While de-
fendant was still in possession of the draperies, he orally asked plain-
tiff if he would sell the draperies and plaintiff consented by saying:
"Very well, the draperies are yours." On the day designated for
payment of the purchase price defendant refused to perform where-
upon plaintiff brought this action for breach of contract. Defendant
'Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., Inc., 273 U. S. 18, 47 Sup. Ct. 265 (1926);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schiavone, 71 F. (2d) 980 (App. D. C. 1934).
In re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147, 11 Sup. Ct. 54 (1890) ; In re Morrisey, 137
U. 5. 157, 11 Sup. Ct. 57 (1890).
aUnited States v. Reaves, 126 Fed. 127 (C. C. A. 5th, 1903) ; In re Scott,
144 Fed. 79 (C. C. A. 9th, 1906).
'Von Der Lippi-Lipski v. United States, 4 F. (2d) 168 (App. D. C. 1925).8 Wassernan v. Feeney, 121 Mass. 93 (1876).
'White v. United States, 270 U. S. 175, 46 Sup. Ct. 274 (1926); Lynch
v. United States, 292 U. S. 571, 54 Sup. Ct. 840 (1934).
" Treasury Decision No. 48, Sept. 29, 1919.
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